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Some Accounting Problems of Investment Trusts*
By Leland Rex Robinson

The importance of the problem which you have invited me to
discuss this afternoon is indicated by the fact that investment
trusts, almost unheard of in the United States in 1920, now
number approximately one hundred and fifty, and register a paidin capital of upwards of half a billion dollars.
In a paper of such brief scope it is obviously impossible to dis
cuss with any thoroughness the multitude of problems raised by
the introduction of the investment trust into the United States.
We shall content ourselves, for the present, with propounding and
endeavoring to answer in at least a general way the few following
questions: What is an investment trust, and how may companies
of this character be classified? What are the sources of income of
an investment trust? On what basis do investment trusts value
their holdings for balance-sheet purposes? What reserve policies
are commended by experience? On what bases are market
values of shares and of participating certificates fixed?
In considering the first of these questions it is perhaps necessary
to make a distinction between the typical investment trust as it
has developed in Great Britain, the homeland of these companies,
and the several variations of the idea to be found in our country.
The typical investment trust and practically every company
popularly so classed in Great Britain show the following
characteristics:
It raises capital by issuing certificates of beneficial interest or
shares—frequently preferred, as well as common. Moreover, the
investment trust commonly exercises its borrowing power by
issuing debentures or bonds within certain well defined restric
tions, and occasionally in other ways.
It invests the funds so obtained in a variety of securities in order
that the law of average may operate in protecting the portfolio.
It avoids controlling interests and so limits its participation in
any one security that directive and managerial responsibilities are
evaded as regards the company which issues it.
It undertakes continuing supervision of the investment fund,
on much the same principles as those which any conscientious
* An address delivered before the Society of Certified Public Accountants of the State of
New Jersey, at Newark, November 22,1927.
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trustee enjoying discretionary powers should apply in caring for
estates.
It endeavors to obtain for its shareholders a return considerably
in excess of that ordinarily received on investments of comparable
safety. This is accomplished in the case of the typical successful
investment trust as the result of:
(1) The favorable average interest and dividend yield which
the trust enjoys by the careful selection and purchasing of secu
rities, tending to be higher than could be obtained with equal
safety if the capital were not sufficient for considerable spreading
of risk;
(2) The balance of cash profits on investment account, which is
the result of managerial alertness;
(3) The spread between the cost of capital obtained through
issuance of debentures or bonds, or preferred shares, and the
actual earnings made by investing and reinvesting this capital;
and
(4) The consistent accumulation of earning reserves and
surplus, built up by regularly appropriating thereto a portion of
net income.
Two purposes, therefore, it would appear, are primarily served
by general investment trusts, and these two purposes underlie
every fundamental principle in their organization and manage
ment. These are distribution of risk in the investment of capital
and continuous and efficient supervision.
While the subject matter of this paper concerns primarily the
general and management type of investment trust, as just defined,
it is important to bear in mind that there are many companies in
the United States which are known as “investment trusts” but
do not conform to the commonly accepted standards. No
clearer distinctions have been drawn, to this time, between the
different kinds of investment trusts than those to be found in the
classification of these companies appearing in the appendix of the
recent report on investment trusts issued by the attorney general
of New York state. From the “Management investment trusts:
general type” (of which 68 are listed in the report) there are set
apart 21 “Management investment trusts: specialized type”
(i. e., companies investing and reinvesting their capital only in
bonds, a limited group of common stocks, shares of financial
institutions or shares in public-utility enterprises).
A third group in the attorney general’s classification is known as
“Fixed, or limited management” investment trusts and totals
15
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some ten American companies issuing straight participating
certificates against “units” of deposited securities held by a
corporate trustee. In funds of this character, it is stated that
“continuous management, upon which general investment trusts
have been built, is either considerably curtailed or else lacking
altogether. ” And finally—perhaps the most important point of
all—there are excluded altogether from the category of invest
ment trusts any “Financial holding companies” whose principal
purpose is to “facilitate the further development of the subsidi
aries” whose securities they acquire, rather than to invest and
reinvest their capital assets with a sole view of obtaining reason
able yield coupled with unusual safety through distribution of risk
and continuous supervision. The current confusion of terms in
this field is thus commented upon:
“As an apparent result of the recent popularity of ‘investment trust
issues’ an increasing number of companies of the holding or financing type
are using the title. These should be excluded. . . . Some unwarranted
conclusions are likely to be drawn from this tendency to rechristen with a
new name financing or holding companies of various kinds which have long
been familiar in American business or have never before been known as
‘ investment trusts. ’ . . . The list could be extended indefinitely if the title
of ‘investment trust’ had with equal logic been applied to companies like
the New York Central, or the Union Pacific; or to public-utility holding
and financing companies like the Middle West Utilities or Consolidated
Gas, with their hundreds of millions in specialized, as well as diversified,
investments.”

The second question propounded may now be answered,
namely, what are the sources of income of an investment trust and
how should income be accounted for? If we exclude from the
scope of this discussion the various forms of income enjoyed by
financing companies and holding companies, and confine our
inquiry to investment trusts of the general and management type,
it is evident that cash income will be derived from three chief
sources: interest, dividends and profits made on changing invest
ments. It is the last, but not necessarily the least, of these
sources of income which will merit our attention for a few moments.
Granted the obvious fact in this most uncertain of worlds that
diversification of risk in itself is of comparatively little use if
unaccompanied by continuous supervision of investments and
that such supervision is an essential condition of safety, the ques
tion suggests itself whether an investment trust has any other
reason for maintaining constant guard over its holdings. The
answer is that it has. The reason is that a properly equipped
investment trust should be able in the long run to realize substan
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tial profits in the investment and reinvestment of its capital and
that these profits should considerably outweigh any losses result
ing from turnover. It is the balance of gains over losses which
accounts for the hidden strength of most British investment
trusts, and it would be a short-sighted institutional investor
which did not at least count upon some such profits for the build
ing up of its reserves and the consequent increase in its returns.
The conception that there is another element in this business of
investment than the current return from interest and dividends—
namely, business profits—is by no means new, but it has been
given new importance in after-war years. In fact, the most
significant development in investment technique has been a
growing conviction that the investment trust, or any other largescale and properly equipped investor, constitutes no exception to
the rule that any successfully run business should provide the
market rate of interest on capital employed there—and further
earnings resulting from the exercise of managerial talent.
The valuation which myriad forces of demand and supply create
for any security at a given time is as much the result of individual
calculations as of objective analyses. If an investment trust buys
an undervalued security and later disposes of it at a figure closer
to intrinsic values it profits from the mistake or need of the
original seller; if the trust sells at an advance tantamount to over
valuation it profits from the over-optimism of the market. In
any case, the investment trust, with its detached viewpoint and
its skilled management, is not easily stampeded and can more
than “hold its own” in a market beset by innumerable conflicting
forces. In other words, the prices at which investment trusts
negotiate their purchases should not only permit reasonable
return on the investment, but should offer a fair prospect of
economic profit. Or, to put it in another way, the investment
trust should render the economic service of reducing erratic price
fluctuations in the securities markets.
To give practical illustration of the ways in which alertly
managed investment trusts may render a financial service, while
building up a sound investment position and making profits while
doing so, let us consider in turn a few of the market circumstances
with which investment trusts are faced. These may be classified
as the age factor, the risk factor, the capital-market factor, the
credit-cycle factor, the international-variation factor and the
price-spread factor.
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THE AGE FACTOR

Between the intrinsic value of some new issues and the estimate
which an uninformed public puts upon them there is occasionally a
broad margin. In one sense at least securities, like wine, may be
said to improve with age. If the issue is fundamentally sound,
the process of “seasoning” which results in broader marketability
frequently enhances the price of a security out of all proportion to
any concurrent gain either in safety or income. British invest
ment trusts have long been in the habit of acquiring securities at
what proved an economic profit by subscribing at the time of the
underwriting arrangements, or by purchasing at a substantial
reduction from even the underwriters’ figures in cases where a new
issue of merit for some reason at first “runs foul” of public favor.
Unpropitious seasons occur in every capital market where the
fingers of underwriters and issuers are burned for reasons not
connected with the real value of the security, which, after a
few months or years of nursing, may find its true level on the
exchanges.
This is not to argue that investment trusts should have con
nection with issuing houses, or be heavily interested in new or
unseasoned issues. The contrary is the case. It is well to re
member, however, that many American securities passed through
British investment-trust portfolios in those decades when we were
borrowing heavily abroad, leaving to these trusts a substantial
profit when the securities received the public recognition they
deserved in the London market. It is quite possible that
American investment trusts may render similar service to their
own financial advantage in acquiring and holding as investments
quantities of newly issued domestic and foreign securities until they
ripen into full public approval. Any profits accruing to them in
this process would be a just reward for intelligent economic service.
THE RISK FACTOR

One reason why new issues are so frequently undervalued, other
things being equal, when compared with “seasoned” securities, is
the element of risk which tends to be unduly exaggerated in the
mind of the average investor by a sense of newness or unfamiliar
ity. The investment trust, however, is, or should be, in position
to weigh the risk objectively. This works both ways. It results
in advantageous purchases when market prices are depreciated
18
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out of all proportion to any reasonable risk premium. It also by
the same token enables a well managed investment trust to avoid
the losses involved in purchasing overvalued “legals” and certain
classes of “gilt edged” investments. The prices of many invest
ments in the latter categories have been raised to levels unwar
ranted by their comparative security. Upon them, over long
periods, has been concentrated the demand, often artificially
stimulated by trustee, savings-bank and kindred laws, of in
dividual and institutional investors among whom reasonable
yield and prospects of appreciation are entirely subordinated to
safety. The investment trust, however, derives its safety
primarily from a broad distribution of risk among carefully
selected holdings, and should turn to its own advantage those
variations in security prices which are ostensibly due to changing
factors of risk but so often reflect merely a mistaken or distorted
interpretation of them.
THE CAPITAL-MARKET FACTOR

The familiar circumstance that the general levels of security
prices and the average rates of return on invested capital vary
from market to market and from country to country at the same
time is also due in some measure to the factor of risk. There is
the additional important consideration of the demand for and
supply of capital in different centers. To what extent these
differences in security prices from market to market at any one
time are due to elements of risk, real or imaginary, and to what
extent they may be attributed to comparative scarcity or other
wise of capital available for loans it is the business of an invest
ment trust to fathom. Granted that a closer knitting of world
financial ties may tend to reduce these variations by distributing
funds available for loans more evenly throughout the world, we
must recognize that the time is not yet in sight when careful study
of comparative investment opportunities in the several leading
countries of the world will not be of decided advantage in the
investment of capital.
THE CREDIT-CYCLE FACTOR

No institutional investor can afford to neglect the differences in
average yield on invested capital from time to time in the same
country. This is of equal importance with variations from coun
try to country at the same time. Such changes in interest rates
19
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over a term of years tend to have a periodic character and are
intimately associated with what economists call the “business
cycle.” They affect in different ways the comparative market
values of fixed and variable income securities. In times of busi
ness prosperity rising interest rates often tend to depress bonds,
though the greater safety of underlying assets, the larger earnings
of the issuers and the general buoyancy of the stock exchanges
often exert a contrary force. Common stocks, on the other hand,
enjoy a combination of influences, such as rising earnings, greater
prospective profits, security and prevailing buoyant markets,
which in the long run tend to outweigh any bearish factors of
rising money rates and drive their prices upward. In times of
business recession the contrary is the case and stocks tend to fall
as bonds rise.
No greater mistake can be made than the assumption that
times of feverish prosperity will last indefinitely, and investment
policies based on this theory are built upon sand. “Everyone
who reads this story,” says Wesley C. Mitchell in his introduction
to the Business Annals (published in 1926 by the National Bureau
of Economic Research), “year after year for nation after nation
will see running through all the episodes one of the problems of
modern civilization. In no country covered by the annals—not
in the most rapidly growing communities developing rich new
lands, and not in the most conservative of old communities—does
a period of economic prosperity ever last more than five or six
years at a stretch. Each country has its seasons of prosperity,
but these seasons always end in seasons of depression. In their
turn the periods of depression yield to new periods of prosperity.
Economic experience is made up of such alternations of good and
ill fortune, and the transitions from one to the other.” All the
more reason, certainly, why the careful investor should seek to
buy his securities, if possible, at those recurring periods of com
paratively low prices and study the changing behavior of bonds
and stocks in different phases of the business or credit cycle. The
fact that the mass of investors neither understands these prin
ciples nor is sufficiently well informed to apply them opens many
opportunities for an adequately equipped institutional investor.
THE INTERNATIONAL-VARIATION FACTOR

Especially, it might be added, if that institutional investor is
prepared to effect its purchases in several different countries.
20

Some Accounting Problems of Investment Trusts
Here is to be found one of the great advantages of the interna
tional investment trust, whose investment facilities are so well
established in the world’s more important financial centers, that,
in full possession of the facts, it may distribute its risks among
the securities of foreign countries as well as its own. This
advantage lies in the fact that “bear markets” in some countries
are accompanied by “bull markets” in other countries; that, in
other words, not the same phase of the business or credit cycle is
manifested in every leading market at the same time.
As a consequence there are almost always some markets where
securities are comparatively cheap, other things being equal,
while in other markets they are comparatively dear. An invest
ment trust with international investment ramifications may take
advantage of good buying opportunities in certain countries, while
at the same time it liquidates some of its holdings in other coun
tries if they have risen to a point where it no longer pays to retain
them in view of investment opportunities elsewhere and in view of
the liquid capital needed to take advantage of them.
The importance of this often overlooked fact may be illustrated
in various ways. In the Conspectus of Business Cycles in Seven
teen Countries recently published by the National Bureau of
Economic Research, it would appear that at the beginning of 1890
prosperity was in full swing in seven countries, business recession
had commenced in five countries and depression prevailed in five
countries. At the end of 1925, on the other hand, according to
these same studies, prosperity appeared in ten countries, recession
in two, depression in four and business revival in one country.
Similar variations occurred in intervening years. While recog
nizing “a trend in the direction of a world economy in which all
nations will prosper or suffer together”, the bureau in a News
Bulletin (November 1, 1926) remarks:
“Yet business cycles do not run a strictly parallel course in any two
countries. . . . Business may be reviving in one country and already
prosperous in another, depressed in one and entering depression in another;
or conditions may be similar during the early part of a year and divergent
in the closing months, or different at the start and convergent at the close.”
THE PRICE-SPREAD FACTOR

Not only do trends in general security prices vary from country
to country at the same time, but price trends among groups of
securities representing different branches of commerce and
industry often show interesting variations within any given
21
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country at the same time. This factor of price spread between
different classes of commodities and different categories of
securities is one of the utmost importance in modern business.
Much work remains to be done in thoroughly analyzing it, and the
bearing of price “lags” and “spreads” upon business cycles is
most significant in the different countries acutely affected by
them. It is for these reasons that economists are so expectantly
awaiting the study of The Behavior of Prices which Professor Fred
C. Mills and his assistants in the National Bureau of Economic
Research have been working upon for a considerable period.

*****

Here, then, are a few of the reasons why properly equipped
investment trusts should and do make profits on turnover. Now
follows the third question: On what basis do investment trusts
value their holdings for balance-sheet purposes? The question is
bound up with profits on turnover. British investment trusts
carry their holdings at cost, less a “contingent fund,” or invisible
reserve, consisting of amounts “written off” the cost of holdings
by appropriations thereto from investment profits. American
investment trusts generally carry their holdings on a cost basis.
Although the investment trust gradually alters the composition
of its portfolio as conditions prove favorable, its securities are in
no sense to be considered as “stock in trade.” It is not primarily
an issuing or dealing house; profits from turnover, although often
very considerable and at times equivalent to a substantial in
crement in its income, are generally of secondary importance as
compared with the dividend and interest yield. Diversification
of the trust’s investments makes this yield reasonably dependable
and perhaps in the majority of investment trusts it is alone
sufficient to meet all ordinary charges of administration and to net
a fair return to the bondholders and shareholders. Fluctuations
in current market value, except in so far as these faithfully reflect
changes in the earning power represented by its securities, are
therefore of less consequence to the investment trust than to the
security dealer or the financing company. A temporary rise or
fall in the market value of any securities in its portfolio is of prac
tical consequence only in case advantage is taken of a rise to
convert a book appreciation into cash, or a fall in order to acquire
further holdings at advantageous prices. Such transactions
figure in the regular accounts.
22
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Frequent valuations are nevertheless advisable. In addition
to the market inventory made at annual or semi-annual intervals
by the auditors, the practice commends itself of periodical ap
praisals of liquidation value made within the organization, by
members of the staff having no access to cost sheets. This kind
of institutional appraisal is made monthly by International
Securities Corporation of America, Second International Securi
ties Corporation and American Founders Trust for the informa
tion of their officers and respective boards of trustees.
Many investment trusts, although basing their balance-sheet
entry for investments on cost, disclose in their published reports
the market valuation, or at least the approximate appreciation or
depreciation revealed by this valuation, as compared with the cost
figures. Although this practice has not been universal, it is
generally regarded as good policy to make appropriations from
current earnings, from reserves or from surplus to write off
depreciated investments where valuations indicate a serious or
permanent impairment of capital.
As suggested earlier, among British investment trusts, the
balance-sheet figure for security holdings is frequently substan
tially less than cost, owing to appropriations to the “contingent
funds,” which are a species of invisible reserve. Contingent
funds are appropriations from cash earnings which do not appear
as reserves in the balance-sheet, but are nevertheless set aside in
the form of earning assets. From the accounting viewpoint these
deductions from income, which are quite apart from appropria
tions to reserve, or from the undivided profits, are used to reduce
proportionately the cost figures at which investments would
otherwise stand in the balance-sheet. The contingent funds are,
therefore, a form of hidden strength which, in addition to regular
reserves, protects British investment trusts from the danger of
book impairment of capital through such a conceivable drastic
downward sweep of world security prices as occurred in the years
immediately following 1920. American investment trusts,
excepting International Securities Corporation of America and
perhaps one or two others, have not to this time made appropria
tions to hidden reserves for the purpose of keeping below cost the
balance-sheet entry for investments.
The British practice of using profits made on investment turn
over for the purpose of writing down the cost of investments
creates two complications from the accounting point of view.
23
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One is that the figure at which investments stand in the balancesheets is a purely arbitrary amount, not directly related to either
cost or market. The other is that British investment trusts in
accordance with their habitual policy of employing profits realized
on turnover to create invisible reserves, fail to disclose these cash
profits in their audited income statements, thus making impossi
ble an accurate knowledge of all sources of their current earnings
and rendering satisfactory comparisons from year to year and
from trust to trust most difficult. To quote once more from the
attorney general’s report:
“This unusual and rather misleading accounting practice is continued
partly because investment trusts in Great Britain are not required to pay
income taxes on realized profits if these profits are not written into the
profit-and-loss account or paid out as interest or dividends but are held as a
kind of invisible reserve. These investment trusts therefore use such
profits in meeting the expense of new issues, in writing off the discount at
which any debentures have been sold, and in writing down the cost of
investments. This practice undoubtedly accounts in part for the low
operating costs of British trusts as revealed in earnings statements. The
figures at which investments are carried in the balance-sheets of these
trusts are therefore likely to be considerably less than cost. This practice
makes comparisons of balance-sheets quite misleading.”

For several reasons, including the fact that American invest
ment trusts under federal law are required to declare and pay
taxes upon investment profits, as well as other sources of cash
income, these companies follow the customary accounting prac
tice in the United States of including investment profits, when
taken, in the income statement. Unrealized, or pure book
appreciation should not, of course, be calculated as income.
The treatment of profits realized on investment turnover has
some bearing upon our fourth question: What reserve policies are
commended by investment-trust experience?
Investment-trust experience demonstrates the wisdom of
building reservoirs between the inlets of net revenue and the out
flow of dividends. By making the outflow, as a rule, considerably
smaller than the intake, these reservoirs should be consistently
enlarged in the form of earned reserves, surplus or undivided
profits. The same prudent management which leads any other
type of financial institution—such as the bank or the trust com
pany—to plough back substantial sums in the form of earning
surplus, equally commends itself in the case of the investment
trust. It is this substantial compounding of reserves over a
period of many years, made possible by following a conservative
dividend policy, that has given to most British investment trusts
24
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their remarkable steadiness of earning power and dividends
during the vicissitudes of the last decade.
EARNINGS APPORTIONED TO RESERVES AND DIVIDENDS

In illustration of the policy pursued by conservative British
investment trust management in appropriations to reserves out of
current income might be cited the Edinburgh Investment Trust,
organized in 1889, which until a short time ago disclosed in the
annual reports its investment profits. Since 1900, roughly
speaking, the Edinburgh Investment Trust has paid out in
dividends on its common shares from 55 to 60 per cent. of its
entire net earnings on this common (from interest, dividends and
investment profits), at least 40 per cent. having been used to
increase the trust’s earning assets. Studies made of some 43
other investment trusts of the United Kingdom would indicate
that on the average not more than 55 to 65 per cent. of the entire
net earnings on their common stock is being currently distributed
in dividends.
The volume and percentage of cash profits on investments vary
widely from trust to trust in the United States as in England, and
this is attributable less to fortuitous circumstances than to the
investment technique and equipment possessed by each company.
There is conclusive proof covering a period of many years that
investment trusts properly equipped and adequately staffed may
in the long run count upon a considerable volume of net invest
ment profits. It may be laid down as a fundamental principle
that the basic test in any case is the proportion of net cash income
from all sources (interest, dividends, stock dividends and sub
scription rights, and profits realized on turnover) which the
reserves, surplus, undivided profits and “contingent funds” or
invisible reserves are currently allowed to absorb.
The rapid building up of reserves is greatly facilitated in many
investment trusts by a conservative issue of bonds, or by offering
certain proportions of preferred stock. Where capital is obtained
at fixed cost in moderate ratios as compared with the amounts of
cash paid in on the common shares, a new element of strength,
rather than weakness, has been introduced into the trust, for the
excess earning power on this fixed-cost capital greatly enhances
the net income out of which appropriations to reserves may be
made. This is the reason why, almost without exception, the
British investment trusts aim to issue debentures to a total of from
25
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50 per cent, to 100 per cent. of the amount paid in on their
stock which is usually issued to the public in ratios of £6 in
preferred to £4 in common. The substantial net earnings and
the heavy reserves characterizing the great majority of these
institutions in London and Edinburgh would have been unattain
able but for this typical capital structure.
We are now ready for our last question: On what bases are
market values of shares and participating certificates of invest
ment trusts fixed?
The factors determining the market value, at any time, of
investment trust certificates or shares are somewhat different in
the case of a trust issuing bonds or preferred stock in conjunction
with common than in the case of a trust offering only participating
certificates or shares of beneficial interest. With the latter, the
share or certificate of beneficial interest, whether it is redeemed by
withdrawal of an equivalent amount from the investment fund or
sold in the market to some new participant in the investment
trust, is necessarily valued at any time on the basis of its propor
tional claim to the entire amount of cash and securities held by
the trust. As reserves are accumulated this value advances,
other things being equal, and at any time it is directly dependent
upon the estimated current liquidation value of all securities
owned by the trust, with addition of sales commissions.
New participants in this simpler type of investment trust must
pay for their securities a figure which varies with the prevailing
market rather than the original cost values of the investments
held; and this figure is not, as is generally the case with corporate
common stocks, a capitalization of earning power. The capital
ization has presumably been effected in the purchase price paid by
the investment trust for its own holdings, and the market value of
the certificates issued by the trust is a direct reflection of prevail
ing liquidation values for all of the trust’s portfolio, as the certifi
cates themselves are essentially a claim upon all the earnings
derived therefrom.
Common shares of investment trusts issuing several types of
security differ vitally from the certificates of beneficial interest
issued by the simpler types of investment trusts. The former
afford a margin of capital safety for the bonds and preferred
shares. They are not a pro rata claim upon the entire investment
fund. Their book value may only be computed by subtracting
from the entire assets of the investment trust the bonded and
26
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other indebtedness and the capital paid in on outstanding pre
ferred stock. The dividends distributed upon such common
shares are taken out of the net earnings after deduction of all
expenses, bond interest and preferred dividends. The prices at
which these common shares sell on the market are usually based
upon a capitalization of their present and prospective earning
power. Book value back of these common shares is generally less
than their market value, because this earning power is derived to
such an extent from capital paid in on preferred shares and bonds.
The prices at which the common shares sell at any given time are
consequently fairly independent of the market value, at that
time, of all the securities held by the issuing investment trust.
To recapitulate, the common shares of investment trusts enjoy
ing an excess earning power are bought and sold in the market on
the basis of the returns they yield their holders rather than the
liquidation value, at any given time, of the entire portfolio of
securities held by the trust. As the dividends paid on common
shares are generally only a part of the net earnings, the market
value of the common shares in most investment trusts giving
adequate attention to the problem of reserves is quite independent
of current fluctuations in stock-exchange prices. This steadiness
of market value is, of course, particularly notable when, other
things being equal, the investment portfolio represents diversifica
tion of risk among the securities of many different countries.
A few remarks may be in order, in closing, concerning the legis
lative proposals contained in the recent report of the attorney
general of New York state. Their bearing upon the problems of
accounting is direct and important. For instance, it is provided
in the draft of legislation that at least once yearly “every invest
ment trust and every foreign corporation licensed by the superin
tendent to transact the business of an investment trust’’ in New
York state shall make such statement of its condition as the
superintendent may prescribe. It is further provided that the
superintendent may call for such special reports as he shall deem
desirable at any time.
No doubt these powers, if finally conferred upon the superin
tendent of banks, will provide a greater uniformity and com
parability of investment trust accounts. By placing accurate
and detailed information in the hands of responsible public
authorities, this proposed legislation will enable the superintend
27

The Journal of Accountancy
ent of banks “ to determine the responsibility and competency of
the organizers” of investment trusts. By requiring a minimum
paid-in capital of $100,000, and by requiring that securities
amounting to $25,000 shall be kept as a pledge of good faith with
the superintendent of banks, the legislation would tend to
eliminate “fly by night” enterprises operating on “shoe-string”
capital.
The spirit of the proposed legislation, which takes the form of
amendments to the banking laws, and which provides for the
incorporation of investment trusts, and the licensing of “foreign”
trusts operating in New York state, is admirably summarized in
the attorney general’s foreword:
“ It is not intended to permit the superintendent of banks to substitute
his management for the management of the investment trust, but he may
check upon it, and may force it to discontinue any unwise or dishonest
practices. . . .
“Lastly and most important of all, it will gradually bring about a
distinction in public opinion between honest and well managed investment
trusts who avail themselves of the legislation and those irresponsible trusts
which will seek to evade the effect of the legislation. All companies in
corporating under its provisions in New York will be required to call them
selves ‘investment trusts,’ and a foreign entity seeking a licence to do
business here must acquire a similar distinctive label. The law will
prohibit the use of the words ‘investment trust ’ to all others, and hence the
public will be able to distinguish readily between investment trusts which
are under state regulation and those which have refused to submit to it and
refrain from doing business in New York, although they attempt to sell
their securities here. It may be confidently predicted that the attorney
general under the Martin fraud act can take care of these latter investment
trusts which attempt to sell securities in New York without incorporating
or obtaining a licence to do business in New York.”

Bearing in mind the indisputable fact that management—
honest, competent and hard-working—is the alpha and omega for
any investment trust meriting public confidence, and that without
such management no standards or restrictions or regulations are
able fully to protect the public interest in any enterprise, it is
fortunate that the legislation proposed does not attempt to lay
down any meticulous requirements or substitute the discretion of
public authorities for the discretion of directors and officers.
What is needed is the development of a greater degree of responsi
bility toward investors—a consensus of professional ethics in a
new field of investment banking—and the legislative proposals of
the attorney general are, I am convinced, a helpful step in this
direction.
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